Citation: Jofre-Bonet, M. and Petry, N. M. (2008 This paper studies polydrug use patterns in heroin and cocaine addicts. We use data on two experiments to measure the elasticity of several addictive drugs with respect to heroin and cocaine prices. Own and cross price elasticities are estimated while controlling for non-price related sources of variance. The results indicate that heroin addicts have an inelastic demand for heroin, complement heroin consumption with cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol and substitute Valium and cigarettes. Additionally, heroin addicts' cocaine consumption is inelastic, and they substitute cocaine with marijuana and Valium, and complement it with alcohol. Cocaine addicts have an elastic demand for cocaine; they complement cocaine with heroin and alcohol and substitute it with marijuana and Valium. Cocaine addicts' demand for heroin is inelastic; and, for this group, alcohol is a complement to heroin while cocaine, marijuana and Valium are substitutes to heroin.
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Introduction
Illicit drug users consume a variety of drugs, with estimates indicating that 50% of heroin addicts use alcohol, 33% benzodiazepines, 47% cocaine, and 69% marijuana (Ball and Ross, 1991) .
Prevalence of marijuana and alcohol abuse in cocaine addicts ranges from 25 to 70% Schmitz et al., 1991) , and between 60 and 90% of substance abusers smoke (Budney et al., 1993; Stark and Campbell, 1993) . Polydrug abuse presents problems for treatment and public health initiatives. Most drug-related emergency room visits involve combinations of alcohol and multiple illicit drugs (NIDA, 1991) . Polydrug abuse increases the likelihood of overdose (Risser and Schneider, 1994) , participation in HIV risk behavior (Petry, 1999) , and poor compliance with treatment (Ball and Ross, 1991) . Thus, the question of how drug users complement and substitute their main addictions as prices change is important and relevant for policy design.
Despite the prevalence and problems of polydrug use, relatively little economic literature has focused on how prices influence polydrug use patterns specifically in addicted populations. We use Deaton and Muellbauer's (1980a) Almost Ideal Demand System to examine substitution patterns. Given a budget and a set of street prices, substance abusers change drug purchases as heroin and cocaine prices vary. Implicitly, we assume that preferences are separable for addictive and all other goods. 1 We estimate two specifications. First, we impose the no-free lunch condition that ensures individuals cannot spend more than they have. Second, we impose two microeconomic consumer theory constraints on the coefficients known as homogeneity (a proportionate change in income and prices will leave consumption of any one good unchanged) and symmetry (cross-price responses of any pair of goods are equal when price changes are compensated by equivalent income changes such that real income and utility remains intact). 3 We compare our experimental results to those obtained from real world situations. Because our estimates lie comfortably within the ranges of previously estimated elasticities, we argue that our methodology may be a valid mechanism to elicit preferences from special populations.
Moreover, characteristics of our sample are similar to characteristics of general addict populations.
We find that heroin addicts have an inelastic demand for heroin. Heroin addicts also complement heroin consumption with cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol, but they substitute it with Valium and cigarettes. Heroin addicts' cocaine consumption is also inelastic; they substitute cocaine with marijuana and Valium, and they complement it with alcohol. In contrast, cocaine addicts have an elastic demand for cocaine; they complement cocaine with heroin and alcohol and substitute it with marijuana and Valium. Cocaine addicts' demand for heroin is inelastic, and alcohol is a complement to heroin while cocaine, marijuana and Valium are substitutes to heroin.
This paper contributes to prior literature in several ways. First, our experiments elicit drug addicts' preferences for drugs in settings that are difficult to study naturalistically. Second, we calculate elasticities controlling for age, gender and race. Third, we apply an econometric methodology that estimates a demand functional form in accordance with consumer theory. Fourth, our data has policy implications specifically related to polydrug use patterns.
Related Literature
Economic studies analyzing elasticities of licit and illicit drugs address two questions. They first examine the Becker-Murphy (1988) for example, may demonstrate different patterns of substitution than heroin-dependent individuals.
To obtain elasticities of interest, we choose the Almost Ideal Demand System proposed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) . While most alternative methods contradict basic principles of microeconomic demand theory, the Almost Ideal Demand System satisfies underlying assumptions of consumer behavior. To our knowledge, only Jones (1989) has applied this approach to the study of addiction. He estimates alternative models of demand for cigarettes and alcohol using budget share equations and concludes that addiction plays an important factor in smoking.
In the economic literature of addiction in general, the range of own price elasticities is surprisingly large and varies by drug, time frames over which prices change (short-vs. long-term), and population. Saffer and Chaloupka (1999a) estimate price elasticities of alcohol, cocaine and heroin to be -0.30, -0.28 and -0.94, respectively, using 1988 , 1990 Surveys on Drug Abuse. Saffer and Chaloupka (1995) report price elasticities of -1.80 to -1.60 for heroin, and -1.10 to -0.72 for cocaine in another national sample of persons of all ages. Grossman and Chaloupka (1998) report the long-run price elasticity 2 of total consumption is -1.35 for youth.
Using percentage of arrestees testing positive for cocaine and heroin and assumptions about the relationship between drug use and the probability of arrest, Caulkins (1996) estimates price elasticities of demand of -2.50 for cocaine and -1.50 for heroin. In contrast, DiNardo (1993) finds that cocaine demand is irresponsive to price changes. Silverman and Spruill (1977) and van Ours (1995) report demand for heroin in Detroit and the short run demand of opium in Indonesia, respectively, to be inelastic. Liu et al. (1999) finds that the short and long price elasticities of opium in Taiwan between 1914 and 1942 were -0.48 and -1.38, respectively. Presumably, the long-term elasticities are more elastic because they assess effects of opium price among a wider range of individuals, including those who have not sampled the drug. As noted earlier, dependent and non-dependent individuals may show different elasticities. Bretteville-Jensen and Sutton (1999) find price responsiveness of heroin to be -1.23 for non-dealing users and -0.20 for dealers who use.
Although fewer economic studies have examined cross price elasticities, Chaloupka, Grossman and Tauras' (1999) find that cocaine and marijuana are either complements or independents. Saffer and Chaloupka (1999b) note evidence of complementarity between heroin, cocaine, marijuana and alcohol, but marijuana substituted for alcohol. Studies in general populations tend to show complementarity between alcohol and illicit drugs Chaloupka 1999a, 1999b) . Pacula (2001) finds that alcohol prices affect negatively marijuana demand (complementarity), but that cigarettes prices do not. Farrelly et al. (1999) maintains that marijuana, alcohol and tobacco are complements, and Dee (1999) shows a robust complementarity between alcohol and smoking. Pacula (1998a and 1998b) likewise finds alcohol and marijuana are complements. Decker et al. (2000) find that higher alcohol prices decrease smoking participation, but higher cigarette prices increase drinking. However, none of these studies have evaluated the cross-price elasticities exclusively in heavy using or dependent populations.
Thus, studies in general populations agree on the negative sign of own price elasticities and some cross price elasticities, but they differ in the range of the estimates. The range is so large that the question arises as to the cause of such diversity: source of information, specification of the model, or the empirical methods. As Hunt et al. (1994) suggests, the lack of attention to the relation between theory and estimation makes discerning the cause of the diversity difficult.
Attempts to understand the economic relationships between drugs have also been made by psychologists, primarily using laboratory paradigms. In these studies, drug-experienced subjects press levers to obtain access to drugs as the number of lever presses is altered as a proxy of price.
In terms of own-price elasticities, demand for alcohol is more inelastic than demand for sucrose in rats with extensive alcohol histories (Petry and Heyman, 1995) , and laboratory studies with human smokers find similar elasticities for nicotine as reported in the economic literature (e.g., Bickel et al., 1991) . With respect to cross-price elasticities, Bickel et al. (1995) review 16 studies in which two reinforcers, one or both of which were drugs, were concurrently available and prices varied 6 systematically. Some drugs are substitutes for others (alcohol was a substitute for PCP ; Carroll, 1987) , some serve as complements (cigarettes are a complement to heroin; Mello et al., 1980) , and others are independent (cigarette use is independent of alcohol prices; Mello, 1987) .
Although relationships between drug prices and consumption could be studied in the laboratory by providing drugs to participants, logistical and ethical considerations exist.
Hypothetical behavioral experiments involve simulation of essential aspects of a situation to elicit the behavior in question (Epstein, 1986) . The methods are used in experimental economics such that resultant data are predictive of real-world behavior (Plott, 1986) . Recently, a paradigm was developed to apply economic analyses to the phenomenon of polydrug abuse. Drug abusers are given imitation money, and prices of drugs are indicated on paper. Subjects state the types and quantities of drugs they would buy, presuming they had the available incomes. Changes in drug choices are examined as a function of prices. A study with heroin addicts (Petry & Bickel, 1998a) finds that cocaine is a complement to heroin. In addition, Valium is a substitute for heroin, but this relationship is not symmetrical; price of Valium has no effect on purchases of heroin in heroin addicts. A second study with alcoholics (Petry, 2001a) finds that cocaine is a complement to alcohol, but alcohol is a substitute for cocaine. Demand for all other drugs is independent of both alcohol and cocaine prices. These studies evaluated how changes in drug purchases affected consumption patterns, without controlling for social demographic variables.
The purpose of this study is to replicate and methodologically improve the above findings by integrating the psychological (laboratory paradigm based) and economic (econometric based) approaches. We examine effects of heroin and cocaine prices on preferences for heroin, cocaine, alcohol, marijuana, Valium and cigarettes. Both heroin and cocaine addicts are tested to assess whether the relationships between drug prices and consumption varies between the two groups.
Data and design
Here, we describe our data, experimental design, recruitment strategy, and summary of characteristics.
Data
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Our data were collected from two experiments run simultaneously. A total of 81 subjects participated, and they were recruited using newspaper advertisements and flyers at low-income housing projects and social service agencies in the Hartford, CT, area. A telephone screen assessed eligibility criteria, which included Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria for heroin or cocaine dependence, age 18 or older, and English speaking. Subjects were categorized into their "hardest" drug of abuse, with heroin considered a harder drug than cocaine. Thus, subjects meeting criteria for heroin dependence were classified as "heroin addicts," even if they were dependent on other drugs, including cocaine. "Cocaine addicts"
included subjects meeting cocaine dependence criteria with or without other dependencies, with the exception of heroin. A structured interview assessed lifetime abuse histories. Subjects also provided a breath sample that was screened for alcohol and a urine specimen that was screened for recent use of opiates, cocaine, and marijuana 3 . Subjects provided written informed consent and received $50 for participation. Those not in substance abuse treatment were referred for treatment. The experimenter read instructions (Appendix 1) and handed subjects $35 of imitation money. The two experiments were conducted concurrently, and the order of conditions was randomized for each subject. Subjects had to allocate their budgets to purchase their ideal consumption basket, given the prices faced. They were presented 8 different price situations generating a total of 648 observations. Since some participants did not choose to spend the entire budget for drugs, we assume that undesired purchases were not made. Nevertheless, participants could not carry over any amount towards purchases in the next experiment. Table 2 contain heroin and cocaine price combinations presented to participants. For each combination, we report the frequency with which participants bought each number of drug units, i.e., two heroin addicted participants did not buy any heroin at all when the price of a bag of heroin was $3 and 1/8 gram of cocaine was $10, while 3 participants decided to buy 11 bags of heroin. Tables 2.3-2.4, 2.5-2.6, 2.7-2.8, 2.9-2.10, and 2.11-2.12 report choices for cocaine, marijuana, alcohol, Valium and cigarettes, respectively. The bottom row of each table reports total amounts of units purchased, and the last cell shows the grand total of units purchased at any price. From looking at the grand totals of Table 2 , we observe that heroin addicts consume more than ten times the quantity of heroin than EZScreen (Editek, Inc., Burlington, NC).
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cocaine addicts do (723 as opposed to 65); cocaine addicts consume about five times more cocaine than heroin addicts (1138 as opposed to 213); heroin addicts consume more marijuana joints (111 as opposed to 72); less alcohol (931 as opposed to 1575); twice the amount of Valium (103 as opposed to 43); and fewer packages of cigarettes (654 as opposed to 954).
As an indicator of the quality of our experimental data, we calculate Spearman correlations 4 between experimental choices and years of regular use of each drug as shown in table 3.
TABLE 3
The number of units of each drug purchased in the simulation is significantly correlated with years of lifetime regular use for each drug. Table 3 also presents point biserial correlations 5 of experimental choices and objective indicators of recent use of heroin and marijuana, as assessed by urinalysis. These correlations are positive and significant for heroin and marijuana, significant at the 92% level for alcohol, and not significant for cocaine. In sum, Table 3 shows that choices made in the experiment are consistent with real life drug use. Therefore, we assume that this is a valid sample of drug addicts to infer illegal drug own and cross price elasticities. In the next section, we describe the econometric specification we use to measure these elasticities.
Econometric Specification
First, we provide the demand system specification used to estimate own and cross price elasticities. Next, we explain how demand system coefficients estimate the elasticities of interest.
The demand of a good equals the aggregate demand of all individuals who constitute the market for that good. Each individual's demand is derived from the decision process of maximizing utility subject to a budget constraint. Assuming an arbitrary aggregate demand function is not innocuous, a particular functional form may impose restrictions on the underlying consumer utility and expenditure functions. Log-linear and linear specifications of the demand for a good are often chosen for their simplicity but may violate the principle that consumers cannot spend more than they have (see Hunt et al. (1994) and Stern (1986) for a detailed discussion of these specifications).
We estimate cross price elasticities of drugs using the demand functional form proposed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) known as the Almost Ideal Demand System. This system gives an arbitrary first-order approximation to any demand system that is consistent with the notion of scarcity (by which individuals are forced to make choices) and satisfies the axioms of individual choice. Besides applying a new methodology for the estimation of price elasticity, our specification also controls for age, gender, education, health and employment status.
Deaton and Muellbauer propose this equation for budget share of the i-th good of household l: 6
where p i is the price of good i; C l /P l is the total real expenditure on all (n) goods in the consumer's budget; P l is a price index; Z il is a set of exogeneous variables describing the individual -or household-l characteristics; and  il is individual l's idiosyncratic taste for drug i.
For a demand system to be in accordance to the properties of demand functions known as adding up, homogeneity and symmetry, the estimated parameters must satisfy these restrictions:
Adding up:
Symmetry:
The restriction of adding-up ensures that the parameters estimated are compatible with the fact that the sum of purchases on all goods has to be equal to their budget ( i w i =1). The restriction of homogeneity guarantees that the underlying demand is homogeneous of degree zero in prices and total expenditure taken together (i.e., if prices and income are multiplied by the same positive number, the quantities purchased are unaffected). Finally, equation 4 guarantees the Slutsky symmetry condition, e.g., cross-price responses of any pair of goods are equal when price changes are compensated by equivalent income changes so that the real income (and utility) remains intact.
We assume that the utility of drugs is weakly separable from the quantities consumed for all other goods. 7 This is consistent with the study design where the budget given to the participants 6 The budget share is the fraction of the individuals total expenditure that is spent on good i: w i =(p i q i / y), where q i is the quantity of good i purchased, p i its price, and y the individual's total expenditure.
was to be spent on drugs, assuming that the fraction of income assigned to all other goods is decided in another decision stage. We consider the second stage of a two stage budgeting process when consumers decide how much of the drug budget they allocate among different drugs, given their relative prices. Adapting the Almost Ideal Demand System in equation (1) to our setting, the budget share of heroin, cocaine, marijuana, alcohol, Valium, and cigarettes are given by:
where subscripts h,c,m,a,v,c stand for heroin, cocaine, marijuana, alcohol, Valium, and cigarettes; subscript l stands for the l th individual, and superscript t stands for the t th price setting, and the rest of variables are defined as for equation (1). For simplicity, from now on we suppress the t superscript. Given the nature of our experiment, instead of using total real income, C l /P l , as described in (1) 
Following Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) , first, we estimate the demand system, equations (5) to (10), without restrictions (3) and (4). By construction, the unconstrained estimated coefficients do satisfy the adding-up constraints since the expenditure shares in drugs sum up to 1.
Second, we test if the unconstrained coefficients satisfy the homogeneity constraint, equation (3), and the symmetry constraint, equation (4). 9 Additionally, we estimate equations (5) to (10) subject to the homogeneity and symmetry constraints, i.e., subject to equations (3) and (4). We call these estimates constrained. Elasticities in (11) and (12) are then calculated using the estimated parameters and individual sample budget share means.
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The next section reports the results of the estimation, and the limitations of the estimates.
Results
In this section, we present the estimates for equations (5) to (10). The system of equations is estimated by using generalized least squares to account for the error correlation structure across equations. We use White-corrected standard errors, which control for the fact that we have repeated observations on individuals. In the next part, we report on own and cross price elasticities.
proxies for real employment and health problems. Although medical and employment problems are potentially endogenous variables in the system, specifications where they were not included did not alter significantly the results. Therefore, we report the specification that includes these two variables. 9 Although due to the nature and design of the experiment there might exist data censoring issues, we choose not to correct for those as have done other published applications using the Almost Ideal System. 10 Assuming that the mean budget shares are independent across individuals, the variances of the own-price and crossprice elasticities have been obtained by using the formulae: (2) and (3) to the data.
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The estimates for the demand system of heroin addicts are reported in (k-1,n) , where k is the number of regressors included, l the number of restrictions when applicable, and n the number of observations.
The homogeneity and the symmetry tests on the unconstrained model coefficients test if these estimates satisfy equations (3) and (4), respectively. To test the homogeneity constraint we test whether the sum of the coefficients of the log of the prices of heroin and cocaine sum up to zero for each equation. Each of statistics tests follows a  2 probability distribution with 1 degree of freedom. To test the symmetry constraint we have to test whether the sum of the coefficients corresponding to the log of the price of cocaine in the heroin equation and the coefficient of the log of the price of heroin in the cocaine equation is zero, and reciprocally, that the sum of the heroin equation's coefficient for the log of the price of cocaine and the coefficient for the log of the price of heroin in the cocaine equation is zero. Each of these statistics follows a  2 probability distribution with 1 degree of freedom.
In the next few paragraphs we discuss the effects of the demographic characteristics on the demand of the various drugs, as reported in Tables 4 and 5 . Since heroin and cocaine price 14 coefficients in equations (5) to (10) cannot be interpreted as price elasticities, we analyze heroin and cocaine price effects on each drug demand using the elasticity estimates reported in Table 6 .
Social Demographic Characteristics:
The effect of years of age, education, race, employment and health problems on the demand of the different drugs can be analyzed looking at the coefficients reported in Tables 4 and 5 .
Looking at the constrained model, we observe that, for heroin addicts, the effect of age is not significant for any drug. Being male increases the use of alcohol. Whites buy relatively more alcohol than non-whites. Years of education influence positively the purchases of heroin and
Valium. Heroin addicts with more employment problems tend to use more heroin but less cocaine and alcohol. More health problems are associated with lower cocaine purchases. In the constrained specification for cocaine addicts, years of age and being white affect positively the use of valium.
Health problems are associated with higher heroin consumption.
In the unconstrained model, and for heroin addicts, being male positively affects use of alcohol and negatively that of Valium. Being white affects positively the consumption of alcohol.
Years of education have a positive effect on heroin and Valium purchases. Employment problems are associated positively to heroin consumption, and negatively to that of cocaine and alcohol.
Finally, health problems are associated with less cocaine. For cocaine addicts, age and being white affect positively purchases of Valium, and health problems relate to heroin use.
With respect to the variable real expenditure, we observe that, for heroin addicts, its sign is significant and negative in both specifications of the heroin demand, and positive and significant for both specifications for the demand of alcohol. Thus, for heroin addicts, an increase in the individual purchasing power due to changes in prices decreases heroin's budget share and increases that of alcohol, which means that heroin is an inferior good where, for these individuals, alcohol could be considered a luxury good. The inferiority of illegal drugs has been documented in the literature. Roy (2005) provides a good summary of the existing evidence.
For cocaine addicts, real expenditure has a negative coefficient for both specifications of demand of heroin and marijuana, a negative coefficient for the unconstrained specification for 15 cocaine, and a positive coefficient for both specifications of the demand for alcohol. Thus, for cocaine addicts, heroin, cocaine and marijuana are inferior goods and alcohol a luxury good.
Homogeneity test: Taking a look at the homogeneity test on the coefficients of the unconstrained model specification in Tables 4 and 5 , we observe that all but the cocaine and marijuana equations do not reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity for heroin addicts. For cocaine addicts, all equations but that of Valium do not reject the homogeneity null hypothesis.
Symmetry test:
The symmetry test on the null hypothesis described in equation (4) is not rejected for both the heroin addicts and the cocaine addicts. The fact that both tests are rejected so infrequently may partially explain why some coefficients are so similar in both specifications. Also, note that even if for a particular drug the unconstrained coefficients do not satisfy the homogeneity and symmetry conditions, they always satisfy the adding-up restriction. Therefore, the generating demand satisfies that there is no free lunch. Even if not optimal, the elasticities obtained using these coefficients present advantages with respect to previously obtained values.
Next, we discuss effects of heroin and cocaine price changes on demand of all drugs in terms of own and cross price elasticities. These elasticities are calculated using equations (11) and (12) and the estimates of the demand system in equations (5) to (10). Table 6 summarizes the own and cross price elasticities of heroin, cocaine, marijuana, alcohol, Valium and cigarettes with respect to changes in heroin and cocaine prices, for heroin addicts and cocaine addicts separately.
TABLE 6
We complement the explanation of effects of heroin and cocaine prices on the demand of the different drugs as reported in Table 6 with figures. These figures plot the average purchases of drugs as a function of heroin and cocaine prices. Note that figures are based on unconditional average purchases while elasticities in Table 6 are obtained controlling by age, education, etc.
Experiment 1:
Heroin price changes expected, on average heroin addicts purchase greater quantities of heroin than cocaine addicts, and in both groups the number of average purchases decreases as price of heroin increases.
FIGURE 1
Heroin own price elasticity: In table 6, we observe that the unconstrained model heroin own-price elasticity for both samples is similar and between -0.917 (heroin addicts) and -0.913 (cocaine addicts), being lower when the homogeneity and symmetry conditions are imposed (-0.818 heroin addicts, -0.882 cocaine addicts). Heroin cross price elasticities: The effects of heroin price changes on all other drug purchases except for heroin are shown in Figure 2 . The effects of heroin price changes in heroin addicts' average purchases appear in the top panel of the figure, and the effects in cocaine addicts' average purchases appear in the bottom panel.
FIGURE 2
In table 6 we see that among heroin addicts, the price of heroin influences the purchases of cocaine, marijuana, Valium, alcohol and cigarettes. Looking at the unconstrained coefficients, we observe that for heroin addicts cocaine (-0.182), marijuana (-0.055) and alcohol (-0.289) are complements where Valium (0.067) and cigarettes (0.242) are substitutes. The constrained specification leads to similar results although for that specification alcohol is a stronger complement (-0.792) and Valium becomes a complement (-0.034).
For cocaine addicts, according to the unconstrained model, cocaine (0.189), marijuana (0.100), and Valium (0.015) are substitutes for heroin, and alcohol (-1.586) is a complement. The constrained specification leads similar qualitative results. Figure 3 shows cocaine average purchases as a function of its price in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2: Cocaine prices changes
FIGURE 3
Cocaine own price elasticity: Table 6 shows price of cocaine significantly affects cocaine purchases in both heroin and cocaine addicts. Demand for cocaine is inelastic in heroin addicts with 17 estimates close to -0.9 (-0.902 unconstrained, -0.892 constrained). For cocaine addicts, demand for cocaine has a negative slope in both specifications but it is elastic (-1.051) in the unconstrained specification and -0.896 in the constrained one.
Cocaine cross price elasticities: Figure 4 shows purchases of other drugs as a function of cocaine prices. In heroin addicts (top panel), according to both the unconstrained and constrained model, marijuana (0.091 and 0.224) and Valium (0.090 and 0.043, respectively) are substitutes for cocaine, while alcohol (-0.384 and -0.635), and cigarettes only in constrained specification, -0.274 are a complement.
In cocaine addicts, heroin is a complement to cocaine according to the unconstrained specification (-0.051) and a substitute in the constrained one (0.057), alcohol is a complement to cocaine according to both models (-0.057 and -0.941), while marijuana (0.052 and 0.090) and Valium (0.006 and 0.011) are substitutes.
FIGURE 4
Limitations:
Results from this study must be interpreted in light of several additional limitations. First of all, choices in this procedure are hypothetical, and they may not be consistent with real-world drug use patterns. Whether substance abusers actually would choose these same types and amounts of drugs in natural settings is not known. Drug preferences were evaluated over large changes in price conditions that may or may not be analogous to how drug prices change on the streets. Two-to three-fold increases in prices were used to evaluate preferences under extreme conditions.
Similarly, prices for illicit drugs also can vary markedly from day to day in real-world settings (e.g., when a large shipment comes in compared to after a police raid). Nevertheless, whether smaller changes in price engender similar effects could be a topic worth studying.
This study evaluated only short-term effects with respect to own and cross-price elasticities.
The present study imposed a one-day temporal frame on purchasing decisions because we, and (Becker and Murphy, 1988) , individuals' long-run elasticities tend to be larger than shortrun elasticities. Secondly, long-run effects of price changes affect not only current users but also participation decisions of potential ones. Thus, the elasticities reported could safely be considered a lower-bound of the long-run elasticities, probably more relevant for policy making decisions.
Other factors, including moods, social contexts, and fear of legal recourse, also may affect choices for drugs, but these variables were not evaluated in the present study. Future research may address the influence of these and other factors and how they may interact with economic variables in influencing drug use (see also Glautier, 1998; Reuter, 1998) .
Policy Implications
Taking the unconstrained model estimates as the relevant ones there are some relevant policy implications of our results. First, heroin addicts are big consumers of heroin, and they also use substantial amounts of cocaine (see table 2 ). For heroin addicts, cocaine is a complement to heroin, and increases in heroin prices reduce their heroin as well as their cocaine consumption. For cocaine addicts, heroin prices do affect both heroin negatively and cocaine positively as cocaine is a substitute to heroin for this group. Therefore, heroin price increases will reduce heroin and cocaine addicts' heroin consumption; but, while heroin addicts' cocaine consumption will be reduced, cocaine addicts' cocaine consumption will be increased. An increase in the price of cocaine will, on the other hand, reduce heroin and cocaine addicts' cocaine consumption and -very moderately-cocaine addicts' heroin consumption. Taking all these considerations together it seems that it may be more efficient to pay special attention to cocaine-price increasing policies rather than to heroin-price increasing policies. The reason is that the former will reduce heroin and cocaine consumption by both types of addicts while the latter will have ambiguous effects by increasing cocaine addicts' cocaine consumption.
From a policy point of view, an important implication of the fact that cocaine and heroin are found to be inferior goods is that income redistributive policies may help alleviate the problem of substance abuse, as indicated by Roy (2005) .
Finally, our results indicate that policies that increase prices of heroin may create greater addiction to Valium and cigarettes for heroin addicts, and to cocaine, marijuana and Valium for cocaine addicts. Similarly, policies that increase the price of cocaine may induce greater addiction to marijuana and Valium for both types of addicts. To put in place compensatory policies to alleviate the spill-over addictive effects of increasing heroin and cocaine prices would seem advisable.
Summary and conclusions
Illicit drug users often abuse a wide variety of drugs. Polydrug use presents an enigma to both medical treatment providers and economists trying to predict the consequences of drug policies. We utilize an experimental method to provide information to psychologists about how drug prices may influence polydrug use patterns controlling for other than price influential factors, and to economists about how price-affecting policies may affect addicts' drug use and their welfare.
We study polydrug use patterns in heroin and cocaine addicts using two experiments that vary heroin and cocaine prices. We obtain own price elasticities of heroin and cocaine, and cross price elasticities of these and other drugs when heroin and cocaine prices vary. We apply an econometric methodology that estimates a demand functional form in accordance with consumer theory. Additionally, this paper illustrates how a particular demand function specification may influence the value of the elasticities obtained. As an innovation with respect to the illicit drug elasticities obtained in experimental settings, we control for other sources of variation besides the change of prices by including demographic factors in our elasticities' estimation method.
Traditionally, the psychological literature has not controlled for demographics in estimating elasticities. Generally, both methods produce similar results, although the econometric analysis finds significant effects of drug prices on larger selections of drugs.
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We find that heroin addicts show an inelastic demand for both heroin (-0.917) and cocaine (-0.902) . Meanwhile, cocaine addicts' seem more responsive to prices. For this group, cocaine demand is very much affected by cocaine price changes (-1.051), but their heroin demand is inelastic (-0.913). Heroin addicts seem to complement their heroin consumption with cocaine, marijuana and alcohol, but substitute it with Valium and cigarettes. Heroin addicts substitute their cocaine consumption with marijuana and Valium and complement it with alcohol. Cocaine addicts behave slightly differently and substitute heroin intake with cocaine, marijuana and Valium, and complement it with alcohol. Cocaine addicts complement cocaine consumption with heroin and alcohol and substitute it with marijuana and Valium.
Taken together, these results suggest that heroin and cocaine addicts show differential demands for drugs depending on the prices of heroin and cocaine, and these effects are not always symmetrical. Heroin is a complement to cocaine for heroin addicts but cocaine prices seem not to affect their heroin's consumption. In contrast, cocaine addicts substitute cocaine for heroin when heroin prices increase but, at the same time complement their cocaine intake with heroin. Heroin addicts have a significantly inelastic demand for heroin and cocaine, while cocaine addicts have an elastic demand (-1.051) for cocaine and an inelastic demand for heroin. Valium is a substitute for heroin and cocaine for heroin addicts, but a much weaker substitute for heroin and cocaine in cocaine addicts. Nevertheless, alcohol seems to be a complement to heroin for both types of addicts but its consumption is much more affected by heroin prices for cocaine addicts. Finally, marijuana is a complement to heroin for heroin addicts and a substitute for cocaine addicts.
Our results are validated from different perspectives: First, drug choices in the simulation are correlated with lifetime drug abuse histories as well as objective indicators of recent drug use and three previous studies (Petry, 2000 (Petry, , 2001a Petry and Bickel, 1998b) . Second, subjects are exposed to the same price conditions twice to assess reliability of choices. Test-retest reliability correlations indicate good reliability between repeat exposures, ranging from 0.44 to 1.0 across studies (Petry, 2000 (Petry, , 2001a (Petry, , 2001b Petry and Bickel, 1998a) . Third, our results are consistent with both economic and clinical findings. Elasticities obtained from this paradigm lie comfortably in the 21 range of elasticities found in the literature. As expected, heroin and cocaine addicts seem to have a more inelastic demand for both heroin and cocaine than general populations. The finding that marijuana use decreases as heroin prices increases seems consistent with evidence in economic research (Saffer and Chaloupka, 1999b) . Clinically, heroin addicts frequently use cocaine and heroin simultaneously, in a drug combination known as a "speedball." The complementary relationship between heroin and cocaine seems congruent with this use pattern in natural settings.
Valium abates opioid withdrawal symptoms in treatment settings (Green and Jaffee, 1977; Woods et al., 1987) , and the finding that Valium is a substitute for heroin is consistent with clinical data.
Cocaine addicts, who by definition were not dependent upon heroin, purchase far less heroin than heroin addicts in this simulation procedure. That alcohol is a complement to cocaine in cocaine addicts is also consistent with clinical and physiological data. Cocaine and alcohol interact to produce coca-ethalyene, a metabolite that has reinforcing effects of its own (McCance-Katz, et al., 1993) and reduces the crash associated with cessation of cocaine use (Gawin and Kleber, 1986 ).
This work illustrates that controlled experiments may provide useful information about preferences for combinations of licit and illicit drugs in a difficult to study group. The use of this paradigm may aid in better understanding how drug users complement and substitute their main addiction(s) as drugs' prices change. These data show how prices of heroin and cocaine influence drug use patterns differently in two distinct groups of drug addicts. The budget share w j is the individual's average budget share for product j and the coefficients' variances and covariances are the estimated ones.
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